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well I have one which just is used as a VPN. So I’ll keep it.
Another question to the providers: how long will they keep it? And any plans for moving those VPS? @EthernetServers
I figure at some point hosts will just have to bite the bullet and either move to KVM or LXC.
Perhaps I misunderstood. I thought the goal was just achieving control of the guest from the host by abusing access to the guest's memory, in which case the minimum you need to do is spawn a shell and establish a way to communicate with the shell.
Remote attestation only works if hardware support is present to protect the guest from the host specifically to prevent anything from being swapped from behind the guest's back. It's sort of like a more efficient and polished version of SGX, but for virtualization.
Remote attestation is a two-way operation and is most certainly possible to achieve with strong cryptographic guarantees. Its purpose is to limit the TCB to a small piece of hardware.
Yeah, i guess, kind of.
Yes, i realize what it does but i'm kinda curious how it bridges the gap so to say. Cryptographic guarantees are only as good as the integrity of the keys being used and the code running the check. The execution needs to be controlled by TPM right from the start (and it has to do this in a way that without it is impossible to replicate by the host) otherwise the strongest guarantees are worth very little since they are simply going to perform their check based on wrong assumptions - at least when there's a hostile host in the picture.
"It works because it works" is a little unsatisfying don't you think?
I don't think there is an OpenVZ option that is not already very end of life is there?
Even virtuozzo 7 only has about 6 months left on extended support and in all honesty probably couldn't or wouldn't patch any new critical issues
As much as I loved OpenVZ (eventually) it feels a bit like running windows xp with a public IP these days, it's not if, it's when it gets compromised.
It's time.... Let it rest in peace 🕊️✌️
It doesn't need to be attested by the TPM at the beginning. So-called late launch measurement (DRTM, on Intel implemented using TXT) can verify code later in the boot process.
Its security does rely on the hardware being secure and the hardware vendor not letting the private key get leaked.
So basically it yet again works because it works. How about we keep it at that. I mean, if you don't control the boot process you also don't control what or if anything gets measured at all but i guess that's a non-issue.
If it doesn't control the whole boot process right from the start there doesn't need to be a leaked key but i've already gone through that before you entered the conversation and it's boring to go over it yet again. Look, i'm more than happy to be proven wrong but this doesn't do anything in that regard. It's just pointless repetition and extremely tiring.
As a hosting provider, I have warned all my clients and shut it down due to a lack of security.
No other words needed
For SRTM (early measurement), each component measures the component it loads, starting with the CRTM which is physically read-only. Combined with the TPM refusing to reset while the system is on, a malicious component cannot retroactively un-extend the PCR that was extended with its hash.
Note that this is about measuring boot. It doesn't stop malicious code from running, it just stops it from running without you knowing so you have the chance not to input any credentials. The TPM will only unseal a secret value if and only if the system's entire boot process matches what it expects, and malicious code can't spoof it because it doesn't know it.
My dear dude... You realize that while this might make perfect sense to someone having spend an extended time analyzing the process (i honestly can't judge - it could be total bullshit bingo for all i know but then i don't see a reason to assume bad faith on your side) it's again completely meaningless to anyone who hasn't? It's nothing but a bunch of important sounding stuff that might or might make not make perfect sense. What is a component in this context? Who does TPM refusing to reset play any role with with this? Maybe you know and likely noone else does making the whole thing for all practical purposes into yet another "it works because it works" and those are rhetorical question, so please... don't try to answer them.
If you just want to win you can have this: You win. The system is perfect and i'm just being suspicious for no reason. There you have it. I'm not sure what it achieves or what it's worth but it doesn't cost me anything, so why not?
If you want to convince me though... this will just do about as much as AMDs complicated looking slide: A whole lot of nothing. It certainly doesn't have to be the case but every time there is a rather simple question (like "if i control execution during the boot process why can't it just neuter/not execute all checks that would stop me from messing with execution or even notice me doing so?") and someone seemingly can't come up with anything but some super convoluted answer that basically translates to "unless you spend weeks and weeks studying this you will never be able to understand such brilliancy, sorry" there's a fair chance they are either hiding something (not even necessarily intentionally) and the devil is in the details or it's just an attempt at bullshitting you right from the start.
Why would this matter at all if the code is never checked or the check runs and always returns true no matter what? ... Seriously, don't you get why this is going nowhere? ...
You know, if there was some actual payout attached to the whole thing (something 5 digits - i mean we are likely easily talking wasting months here with studying, trying to write POCs and whatnot) i might have a bit of motivation to go deeper into this but as far as i can see no such a payout exists, so my interest in a deep dive into what's ultimately a pretty dry and boring topic is severely limited.
It's not that complicated: https://security.stackexchange.com/q/39329/106285
All it does is ensure that malicious software (or even a malicious BIOS) won't go undetected. If you want to believe that measured boot does nothing or is trivial to bypass, you can, but unless you have hardware access, there's really not much you can do to bypass it. The fact is that you can limit trust to hardware so that you can verify that even a remote system has not been tampered with, even if that remote system is running malware. If you don't want to believe that's possible, then there's nothing I can do to convince you beyond trying to explain or linking to sources that contain the details.
But there's no need to keep discussing it if you don't want to. I gave links that explain it if you wish to read them.
I see problems right in the first 1,5 paragraphs but what i'm not seeing is a paycheck. Let's finally end this. You just win. It's easy, 100% secure and i'm just needlessly nitpicking.
I'm not trying to win some argument. It just sounds like you're saying that measured boot cannot possibly exist, and I'm saying it does exist and providing sources. That's all. It's literally the raison d'etra of a TPM. Doesn't mean it's perfectly secure (with hardware access, you can often bypass it), but it does what it claims to do.
Cool story, bro.