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Dirty Frag: Universal Linux LPE

zedzed Member
edited May 7 in General

As with the previous Copy Fail vulnerability, Dirty Frag likewise allows
immediate root privilege escalation on all major distributions.

For detailed technical information about the vulnerabilities and the reason the
embargo was broken, please check https://dirtyfrag.io.

https://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/07/10

REDACTED [Libera] -!- WALLOP amdj: [Network Notice] Linux system administrators should beware of another local privilege escalation vulnerability that recently dropped (CVE number not yet assigned): https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag/blob/master/README.md

edit: redacted timestamp to keep my timezone secure!!

«13

Comments

  • deafcondeafcon Member

    It's every freaking day now.

  • MikeAMikeA Member, Patron Provider

    This one is worse than the previous imo.

  • davidedavide Member

    That my paranoia pays out can finally be publicly acknowledged by you all folks:

    $ uname -r
    3.16.0-6-amd64
    
    $ ls /usr/bin/sudo
    ls: cannot access '/usr/bin/sudo': No such file or directory
    

    and no file on the filesystem uses extended attributes (ping requires root).

  • NeoonNeoon Community Contributor, Veteran

    At this rate, microLXC will be switching to kvm, yesterday.

  • glueckselfglueckself Member
    edited May 7

    It goes very well with the Apache RCE (CVE-2026-23918)
    TLDR: Running Apache? Instant root...

    Thanked by 1tux
  • zedzed Member

    lol we're doomed, switching all my vps to win7

  • olokeoloke Member, Host Rep

    @Neoon said:
    At this rate, microLXC will be switching to kvm, yesterday.

    Can't wait for microLXC to be acquired by microKVM and rebranded :D

    Thanked by 4tux rpqu tentor mandala
  • NeoonNeoon Community Contributor, Veteran

    @oloke said:

    @Neoon said:
    At this rate, microLXC will be switching to kvm, yesterday.

    Can't wait for microLXC to be acquired by microKVM and rebranded :D

    Not gonna register another domain unless you pay for it.

  • I really should have filed for PTO.

  • glueckselfglueckself Member

    I wish I could take PTO from my self-hosted stuff.

  • JabJabJabJab Member

    2026-05-07: Detailed information and the exploit for this vulnerability were published publicly by an unrelated third party, breaking the embargo.

    Who was this amazing person please!?

  • glueckselfglueckself Member

    If you're applying the mitigations, you need to reboot or drop caches (https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag/issues/1)

    Thanked by 1whynotlearn
  • glueckselfglueckself Member

    Oh, and the mitigation might kill your IPsec tunnel. I don't know much about IPsec, I have only one in my DN42 lab, but that didn't came up after mitigations + reboot.

  • dbadudedbadude Member

    MAMA

  • MikeAMikeA Member, Patron Provider

    mia?

    Thanked by 1Murv
  • slowserversslowservers Member, Host Rep

    Thank you for posting!

    The author didn't test on Debian 13, so I tested it (well, I probably would have anyway!) I removed the buggy module that copy.fail requires.

    monero@localhost:~$ /var/tmp/dirtyfrag/exp
    # id
    uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
    

    Working there. I guess there's no fix other than a manual patch and recompile right now.

    What another great day to be using OpenBSD on most systems!

    Thanked by 1TrikeLike
  • glueckselfglueckself Member

    @slowservers said:
    Working there. I guess there's no fix other than a manual patch and recompile right now.

    esp{4,6} and rxrpc are modules on Debian 13, so the modprobe.d mitigation is still possible.

    Thanked by 2slowservers tentor
  • Micro-VM's are really looking attractive to many of these issues.

    Has anyone tried anything to see if something similar can work on android this time around?

  • Here we go again

  • forestforest Member

    @zed said: edit: redacted timestamp to keep my timezone secure!!

    But do you block CTCP TIME?

    Thanked by 1zed
  • defaultdefault Veteran

    Ai

    Thanked by 1ehab
  • forestforest Member
    edited May 8

    @MikeA said:
    This one is worse than the previous imo.

    They're both actually really mild because the mitigation is so easy: blacklist the kernel modules. LPEs in Linux are common but usually don't get their own CVE published or a user-to-root PoC written. It would be a lot more scary if we started seeing trivial vulnerabilities in the core kernel in places that are hard to mitigate, like futex() or the core mm subsystem.

    For the future, this is a good reminder to everyone to run sysctl -w kernel.modules_disabled=1 so modules won't be autoloaded. There are SO many kernel modules that will get autoloaded that bugs are always just waiting to be found.

  • zedzed Member

    This is additional info regarding the "embargo break"
    https://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/07/12

    At least one of the public artifacts in circulation — my "Copy Fail 2: Electric Boogaloo" repo — is an n-day built from the public netdev fix commit, not a break from inside the embargo.

    Timeline on my end: - Steffen Klassert's fix landed publicly on netdev/net.git as commit f4c50a4034e62ab75f1d5cdd191dd5f9c77fdff4.

    Brad Spengler (@spendergrsec) publicly called the commit copyfail-class. - I read the commit, recognized the xfrm ESP-in-UDP MSG_SPLICE_PAGES no-COW path against shared pipe pages as an LPE primitive, and built a PoC.

    This shit happens live and in realtime in case you didn't realize!

    From the email:
    Copy_Fail2-Electric_Boogaloo Write-up:
    https://afflicted.sh/blog/posts/copy-fail-2.html
    https://github.com/0xdeadbeefnetwork/Copy_Fail2-Electric_Boogaloo
    https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git/commit/?id=f4c50a4034e62ab75f1d5cdd191dd5f9c77fdff4

    Thanked by 1forest
  • MikeAMikeA Member, Patron Provider
    edited May 8

    @forest said:

    @MikeA said:
    This one is worse than the previous imo.

    They're both actually really mild because the mitigation is so easy: blacklist the kernel modules. LPEs in Linux are common but usually don't get their own CVE published or a user-to-root PoC written. It would be a lot more scary if we started seeing trivial vulnerabilities in the core kernel in places that are hard to mitigate, like futex() or the core mm subsystem.

    For the future, this is a good reminder to everyone to run sysctl -w kernel.modules_disabled=1 so modules won't be autoloaded. There are SO many kernel modules that will get autoloaded that bugs are always just waiting to be found.

    I agree, but the problem is the amount of hosts, especially web hosting providers, that can be 100% destroyed if their team isn't monitoring for these new exploits hourly 24/7. I contacted some people about this who had no idea about it, and could have been wiped.

  • forestforest Member
    edited May 8

    @MikeA said:

    @forest said:

    @MikeA said:
    This one is worse than the previous imo.

    They're both actually really mild because the mitigation is so easy: blacklist the kernel modules. LPEs in Linux are common but usually don't get their own CVE published or a user-to-root PoC written. It would be a lot more scary if we started seeing trivial vulnerabilities in the core kernel in places that are hard to mitigate, like futex() or the core mm subsystem.

    For the future, this is a good reminder to everyone to run sysctl -w kernel.modules_disabled=1 so modules won't be autoloaded. There are SO many kernel modules that will get autoloaded that bugs are always just waiting to be found.

    I agree, but the problem is the amount of hosts, especially web hosting providers, that can be 100% destroyed if their team isn't monitoring for these new exploits hourly 24/7. I contacted some people about this who had no idea about it, and could have been wiped.

    Absolutely. It's quite a trivial privesc.

    It's also yet another reason why containers suck as an isolation technology.

    Thanked by 1tentor
  • jfracjfrac Member, Host Rep

    VM escape 0-day when?

  • forestforest Member
    edited May 8

    @jfrac said:
    VM escape 0-day when?

    They happen but severe vulnerabilities in the host kernel part of the hypervisor are relatively rare (except for in Xen lol) considering its much smaller attack surface area. Most exploitable vulnerabilities are in the userspace components, e.g. QEMU, which are easier to mitigate with sandboxing.

    Thanked by 1jfrac
  • there has to be a way to blacklist all unused modules if the vps are just being used for a wireguard tunnel, ping probe or something, anyone ever made this kind of list?

    i'm not being a skitzo here but it's just inane if there's a weekly easy-to-exploit vuln just because some module in lunix kernel is enabled and i never uses it in the first place. i'm losing billions of dollah here every 1 min applying a mitigation and doing one reboot in every chicken. someone has to stop this!

  • forestforest Member
    edited May 8

    @ScreenReader said: there has to be a way to blacklist all unused modules if the vps are just being used for a wireguard tunnel, ping probe or something, anyone ever made this kind of list?

    sysctl -w kernel.modules_disabled=1
    

    That will prevent loading and unloading of new modules that aren't already loaded.

    Thanked by 2ScreenReader hostal
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