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Comments
Do you allow port forwarding ?
What makes it premium ?
Default WireGuard encryption or something else ?
Do you allow public torrents ?
Unlimited vs unlimited?
The best limited is unlimited.
Please update your ToS to reflect such.
Maybe change billing template so that everyone is named “Incognet HostCram Customer Privacy” and only accepting an email address?
Not allowed at the moment.
It's basically the same bandwidth we have for VPS servers going through a dedicated NIC and our Juniper switch.
Default WireGuard encryption.
We aren't blocking anything at the moment.
Fast vs Faster
Is the 5x premium on premium bandwidth worth it over the priority bandwidth option. How does this compare to premier or ultra offerings from other services 🤔
What is the advantage of you over other established VPN providers?
For example Airvpn offers over 250 servers in more than 20 countries and 5 Simultaneous connections. 50$ per year (32$ on black friday)
You offer one Server and one connection.
So whats the deal?
You should just buy the $10/Year Basic plan, the Pro plan is for those who wants priority data transfer and more bandwidth.
what's the advantage of the $50 plan one, if it's priorty and more bandwidth, vs other providers who do the same but cheaper?
I genuinely laughed when I saw "dedicated private IP"
Who would have thought
To everyone wondering if the VPN or its upstream is keeping logs: https://security.stackexchange.com/a/175186/106285
Even if it doesn't keep logs, you'd need to be sure that none of the hops that you see in a traceroute keep logs. It's not enough just to trust the VPN provider or their direct upstreams. Do you trust the upstreams of the destination websites you're visiting over your VPN? Or networks on the dynamically-changing routes between the VPN and them? Surely not.
VPNs are fine for casual anonymity (protecting against the MPAA/RIAA) and for protecting your internet connection when you're on an unsecured network like public Wi-Fi, but you should never rely on any VPN for real anonymity. VPNs are still fine though, don't get me wrong, but if your threat model includes NetFlow-level monitoring, a VPN is not going to be particularly bulletproof unless you use something like Tor (and even Tor is not completely flawless in every threat model).
If your VPN provider actually doesn't keep logs, then there is no way of mapping the logs from other hops to you as an individual no?
There is, because each other hop is only forwarding your data. If your home ISP is not trusted (which is taken as a given if you are looking for a VPN), then all it takes is one network logging the connection between the VPN and your destination website and, along with your home ISP's logs, it'll be able to reliably correlate the activity to you.
Imagine:
Here, the intermediate ISP is any ISP between the VPN and LET (whether it's near your VPN or is literally LET's own upstream). If the intermediate ISP is logging, then it, with the help of your home ISP, can conclude that you visited lowendtalk.com despite you using your VPN and despite the VPN and its immediate upstreams not keeping logs.
Of course, the real world will have potentially thousands of other requests mixed in with those 4 steps, but there are only so many possible combinations and it doesn't take many page loads before it's possible to exclude connections that can't possibly have been yours until only your own connections remain. Quite a few efficient algorithms have been developed to do just that and they work quite well given enough logs.
That's not to say VPNs are shit. It'll still prevent the average website from knowing who is behind the VPN IP that connected to it, but it's not going to be effective all of the time against an adversary with access to network timing information. Tor is much better because it pads "cells" up to 514 bytes, and because the higher jitter makes it more difficult to correlate timing information. Additionally, there are far more possible exiting IPs to keep track of. Tor also sends periodic keepalives that "collapse" NetFlow records in their default configuration. But even Tor has some vulnerability to this general type of attack (a traffic correlation attack), especially due to the fact that many high-capacity relays are concentrated on just a few providers.
i see what you meant, however this does feel quite impractical tho, unless you are on the top list of some intelligence agencies. if i understand correctly, the intermediate isp could say, log the footprint of certain data that they know were destined to a questionable server, and law enforcement was acknowledged of it, the next thing they need to do is to ask every single isp on planet earth about who sent the data with those footprint within a specific timeframe right? that just seems like, too much. especially considering the current international relationships and how willing is everyone to comply if its actually cross border. after all there is no perfect security but only about making the cost of an attack higher than the potential reward
Or just purchase the data from a data broker in bulk like many companies do. But the original worry was about NetFlow records, which is already something that the average person has to worry about less than, say, old-fashioned cookie-based tracking. If NetFlow-level monitoring is within your threat model, then a VPN is certainly insufficient.
No, just a single network between the VPS server and the destination. Just think of any network that owns a significant portion of the internet, such as Cloudflare.
It's not the government sharing the data, it's for-profit companies which will happily operate anywhere they legally can.