No interaction with the VM in the panel for you as well?

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feel free to ask for original or ask other questions

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account, which is controlled by CloudCone's own panel (acting as a middle proxy), yet attacker could still issue commands for Virtualizor over it (i.e. start/reboot VPS, and probably something else w

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Just received this in a private message from @virtualizor

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What happened here is attackers had access to the Virtualizor panel itself, then used the terminal feature to reach all slave nodes. That's panel access, not a VM escape.

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• Disable terminal access from Master → Settings → Security on both the master panel and all nodes, then resync the nodes

But this brings us back to the main question: if it's not a credential leak, then how are attackers getting into the admin panel now?

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There was a Virtualizor support security breach at that time, which resulted in any passwords shared with support being exposed. This is old news, and users were notified by email and instructed to ch